Perspective on Sadr and the Current Fiasco in Iraq

Spencer Ackerman has a piece in the Washington Independent about how Sadr is an effective counterinsurgent because he was able to reach out to disenfranchised Shi'ites and implement some form of political stability in the early days of OIF. I'm no Iraqi, so I'm reluctant in speaking for Sadr's popularity, but recent events have shown how the Sadr and his Mahdi Army followers are more engaged in Tony Soprano tactics than Robin Hood-style benevolence. The racketeering of basic services, which the Mahdi Army employs to control the population of the Sadr City district in Baghdad, is exemplified in this Time article:

Sheikhly said government aid delivery has been directly targeted by armed fighters. "The food rations and convoys are being targeted with IEDs," the government spokesman said. "The ambulances are being targeted with IEDs, and the vehicles which try to replace generators in some of the sectors are also being targeted by some of those terrorists."

More blame will be placed on the Iraqi government and US forces for not being able to provide food/services, because of these tactics which only harm the residents. By intentionally exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Sadr City, the militia can gain more power and psychological control of the district's impoverished residents, as they convince the people that their government has abandoned them.

The recent Iraqi delegation to Iran should be taken with a grain of salt, but it appears that Iran publicly supports the recent crackdown on Shi'ite militias. The exportation of lethal weaponry (EFPs, 240mm rockets, anti-aircraft missiles, etc.) and training of special groups has compounded the problem of Shi'ite militias in Iraq, as Iran has played a dangerous game of destabilizing Iraq to make their old rival, the US, look bad. This recent delegation has the potential to stop at least some of the malign activity, and the special groups (using the Mahdi Army as religious cover) may see funds and weapons drying up in the near future.

So that would just leave the Sadrists (without Iranian backing), who supposedly are getting less popular in the rest of Baghdad (see recent article from Bill Ardolino). General Petraeus still hasn't burned the bridge for political reconciliation with the Sadrists, as he publicly stated "I think it's very important to recognise that the Sadr trend, as a political movement, has every reason to be engaged in the political spectrum, in the political arena, in Iraq." So Sadr and his spokesman can either recognize that the only organized armed groups should be the Iraqi Security Forces, or this violence can go on and on until October provincial elections while the citizens of Baghdad suffer.